Maryland Tort Damages: A Form of Sex-Based Discrimination by Korzec, Rebecca
University of Baltimore Law Forum
Volume 37
Number 2 Spring 2007 Article 2
2007
Maryland Tort Damages: A Form of Sex-Based
Discrimination
Rebecca Korzec
University of Baltimore School of Law, rkorzec@ubalt.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Law Forum by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information,
please contact snolan@ubalt.edu.
Recommended Citation
Korzec, Rebecca (2007) "Maryland Tort Damages: A Form of Sex-Based Discrimination," University of Baltimore Law Forum: Vol. 37:
No. 2, Article 2.
Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf/vol37/iss2/2
ARTICLE 
MARYLAND TORT DAMAGES: A FORM OF SEX-BASED 
DISCRIMINATION 
By: Rebecca Korzec* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Maryland law provides that "compensatory damages are not to be 
awarded in negligence or strict liability actions absent evidence that 
the plaintiff suffered a loss or detriment."} At the same time, 
Maryland imposes a statutory cap on noneconomic damages in tort 
claims for personal injury.2 First enacted in 1986, the statutory cap 
imposed a $350,000 limit on recovery of noneconomic damages.3 
Following a Court of Appeals of Maryland decision that the cap did 
not apply to wrongful death actions,4 the Maryland General Assembly 
explicitly modified the statute to include wrongful death actions.s At 
the same time, the cap was increased to $500,000 for causes of action 
arising after October 1, 1994.6 In 1996, the Maryland General 
Assembly increased the cap by an additional $15,000 for causes of 
action arising after October 1, 1995.7 A single cap applies to the 
action of an injured spouse and includes the award for loss of 
consortium. 8 
In this essay, I argue that the statutory cap on noneconomic 
damages in Maryland disproportionately disadvantages women. For 
this reason, the cap, although facially neutral, is in fact discriminatory 
*Professor, University of Baltimore School of Law 
I. Owens-Illinois v. Armstrong, 87 Md. App. 699, 735, 591 A.2d 544,561 (1991). 
2. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 11-108(b) (West 1986). 
3. Id., see also Gooslin v. State, 132 Md. App. 290, 298,752 A.2d 642,646 (2000) (holding 
cap does not violate equal protection claims); Edmonds v. Murphy, 83 Md. App. 133, 
573 A.2d 853 (1990), affd 325 Md. 342, 370, 601 A.2d 102, 116 (1992) (holding a cap 
on noneconomic damages is constitutional). 
4. United States v. Streidel, 329 Md. 533, 552, 620 A.2d 905, 915 (1993). 
5. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PRoc. § 11-108(a)(I)(ii) (West Supp. 1994) [hereinafter 
CTS. & JUD. PROC.j. 
6. CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 11-1 08(b )(2)(i). 
7. CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 11-108 (West Supp. 1995). The $15,000 increase will take effect on 
October 1 of each year. 
8. Oaks v. Connors, 339 Md. 24, 37-38,660 A.2d 423, 430 (1995); see also Klein v. Sears, 
Roebuck & Co., 92 Md. App. 477, 492-94, 608 A.2d 1276, 1283-84 (1992) (holding 
spouse entitled to damages for loss of services, affection, society and sexual relationship 
deceased spouse would have contributed if spouse had lived). 
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in its impact on female litigants.9 In addition, the cap may have the 
unintended effect of limiting the quality of the legal representation 
available to female tort litigants in Maryland. 1O Moreover, several 
other issues in Maryland tort law may inadvertently contribute to 
discrimination against women litigants. These include the Maryland 
adherence to contributory negligence as a complete bar to negligence 
claims and the Maryland approach to punitive damages. Ultimately, 
Maryland tort law, although facially neutral, disadvantages women. 
II. DEVALUATION OF WOMEN'S WORK 
Scholars have suggested that both the method of calculating tort 
damages and tort reform legislation, II such as statutory limits on 
noneconomic damages, harm women. 12 For example, Martha 
Chamallas argues that courts rely on gender-based generalizations in 
calculating damages for future earnings. 13 Employing gender-based 
tables founded on economic patterns for women results in lower 
awards for individual female plaintiffs because the tables project the 
fact that women earn less than men. I4 Such damage awards perpetuate 
inaccurate gender stereotypes of women, devalue the employment 
contributions of individual women and deprive those women of just 
compensation for their tort injuries. IS 
9. Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, The Texas Two-Step: Evidence on the Link Between 
Damage Caps and Access to the Civil Justice System, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 635, 643-47 
(2006); see generally, Leslie Bender, A Lawyer's Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 
38 J. LEGALEDUC. 3 (1988) [hereinafter A Lawyer's Primer]. 
10. Daniels, supra note 9; see also Lucinda M. Finley, The Hidden Victims of Tort Reform: 
Women, Children, and the Elderly, 53 EMORY L.J. 1263, 1313 (2004) [hereinafter Hidden 
Victims]. 
11. See, e.g., Finley, Hidden Victims, supra note 10; see generally Leslie Bender, An 
Overview of Feminist Torts Scholarship, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 575 (1993); see, e.g., 
Martha Chamallas, The Architecture of Bias: Deep Structures in Tort Law, 146 U. PA. L. 
REv. 463, 465, 503-04, (1998) [hereinafter Architecture of Bias]. 
12. See Finley, Hidden Victims, supra note 10, at 1267-80, 1313; see generally Michael L. 
Rustad, Nationalizing Tort Law: The Republican Attack on Women, Blue Collar Workers 
and Consumers, 48 RUTGERS L. REv. 673, 733, 744 (1996); Thomas Koenig & Michael 
Rustad, His & Her Tort Reform: Gender Injustice in Disguise, 70 WASH. L. REv. 1, 1, 5 
(1995). 
13. Martha Chamallas, Questioning the Use of Race-Specific and Gender-Specific Economic 
Data in Tort Litigation: A Constitutional Argument, 63 FORDHAM L. REv. 73, 75 (1994) 
[hereinafter Questioning the Use]. 
14. Id. 
15. Id. 
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The devaluation of women's work results in lower tort damage 
awards which fail to adequately compensate them for their losses.16 In 
the aggregate, women's tort damage awards are lower than their male 
counterparts. I? Since the goal of tort damages is to make the tort 
victim whole, it is not surprising that tort damage awards reflect and 
reinforce gender disparities. IS In particular, feminist scholars argue 
that "tort law devalues the lives, activities, and potential of women, 
and that one can see this at work both in substantive rules ~overning 
liability and in common methods for calculating damages.,,1 Women 
earn less than their male counterparts in all work environments;20 
therefore, their economic damages are lower than awards for male 
plaintiffs.21 Martha Chamallas has demonstrated that in a 1995 guide 
for personal injury lawyers, awards to male plaintiffs were twenty-
seven percent higher than for women.22 Significantly, a nationwide 
study of personal injury awards by juries indicated that women 
received lower median and mean awards for compensatory damages?3 
These studies demonstrate that tort damages reinforce gender-based 
stereotypes about women. Contemporary tort law elevates some types 
of injuries, giving them more legal protection and awarding greater 
damages. Claims and injuries associated with women often receive 
less legal protection in the societal hierarchy which tort doctrine 
reflects. For example, tort doctrine places a higher value on physical 
injury and property loss than emotional harm. Moreover, tort reform 
legislation stresses the importance of economic losses, such as lost 
income and medical expenses over noneconomic damages, such as 
16. [d. 
17. [d. 
18. See generally John C. Coughenour, The Effects of Gender in the Federal Courts: The 
Final Report of the Ninth Circuit Gender Bias Task Force, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 745 
(1994). 
19. MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 198 (1999). 
20. In 2005, women were paid seventy-seven cents for each dollar paid to men. See 
America's Union Movement, EQUAL PAY (Mar. I, 2007), 
http://www.aflcio.orglissues/jobseconomy/womenJequalpay.html. Much of the reason for 
this is that women perform unpaid childcare, household work and care of elderly 
relatives in more significant numbers than men. Scholars have argued that such unpaid 
work should be compensated and recognized. See, e.g., JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING 
GENDER 125-27 (2000) (proposing that the non-wage earning spouse receive a joint 
property right in the income of the wage earning spouse); Katharine Silbaugh, Turning 
Labor into Love: Housework and the Law, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 1,3-6 (1996). 
21. See Chamallas, Architecture of Bias, supra note 11, at 464-65. 
22. CHAMALLAS, supra note 19. 
23. [d. 
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pain and suffering, emotional distress, hedonic damages, loss of 
companionship and punitive damages.24 
Maryland substantive tort law, like tort law in general, does not 
recognize a cause of action for caretakers of children when those 
children are injured. As the child's primary caretaker, women usually 
have greater responsibility for a child's safety and happiness. Women 
caretakers tend to fslace an extremely high value on their relational ties 
to their children. 5 When a child is seriously injured, the child's 
caretaker also suffers. For example, the caretaker must deal with the 
child's injury and disability. The caretaker may feel intense grief and 
anxiety, even guilt. The effects of an accident can be life-altering for 
the caretaker as well as the child.26 Yet, tort law largely dismisses the 
caretaker's loss, assigning it mere derivative status. It denies a claim 
for "filial consortium" for the loss of the child's companionship.27 
These losses fall more heavily on women as primary caretakers of 
children in our society. Today, most child caretakers are women --
. mothers, randmothers, paid nannies, babysitters and day care 
providers.2 Although popular culture praises "stay at home" mothers, 
such as the "soccer mom" who abandons the workplace to raise her 
children, tort law provides her no separate claim for the devastating 
impact of her child's injury on her daily life. The most dramatic, 
painful and devastating event in the mother's life, as primary caregiver 
of her child, is likely not compensable in tort law. 
III. GENDERED TORT REFORM 
Added to this problem of undercompensation is the "tort reform" 29 
movement, leading to limits on damage recovery, such as statutory 
24. Id. at 199. 
25. Mary Becker, Maternal Feelings: Myth, Taboo, and Child Custody, 1 S. CAL. REv. L. & 
WOMEN'S STUD. 135, 153, 157-58 (1992). 
26. See, e.g., Regina Graycar, Before the High Court: Women's Work: Who Cares?, 14 
SYDNEY L. REV. 86, 87 (1992) (describing hardships suffered by a mother caring for her 
disabled daughter). 
27. Lucinda M. Finley, A Break in the Silence: Including Women's Issues in a Torts Course, 
1 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 41, 50 (1989) [hereinafter A Break in the Silence]. In 1997, 
Maryland changed wrongful death actions to permit parents to recover noneconomic 
damages for the wrongful death of an adult child. MD. CODE ANN., CTs. & JUD. PROC. § 
3-904(e) (LexisNexis 2006). 
28. See, e.g., Becker, supra note 25 at 137, 213, 219. Most caretakers and maids in the 
United States today are immigrant women of color. BARBARA EHRENREICH & ARLIE 
RUSSELL HOCHSCHILD, GLOBAL WOMEN: NANNIES, MAIDS AND SEX WORKERS IN THE 
NEW ECONOMY 6-7 (Barbara Ehrenreich & Arlie Russell Hochschild eds., 2003). 
29. See generally supra note 12. 
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caps. This refonn is fueled by what business and insurance interests 
consider a litigation explosion, defined by excessive jury awards, 
increased class action litigation and frivolous suits. As in Maryland, 
the tort reform movement often saw the enactment of legislative limits 
or caps on noneconomic damages, often extending beyond medical 
malpractice and products liability claims, to include all personal injury 
claims. 
As previously argued, these caps may have a negative impact on 
women. For example, an empirical study by Thomas Koenig and 
Michael Rustad indicates that women litigants are detrimentally 
affected when noneconomic damages are limited. 30 . The study 
demonstrates that women comprise two-thirds of plaintiffs recovering 
punitive damages in medical malpractice cases, particularly in gender-
linked cases involving sexual abuse, cosmetic surgery, childbirth and 
nursing home abuse.3\ Moreover, significant mass products liability 
litigation has focused on women's reproductive health and gender-
linked injuries. These include the Dalkon Shield, Norplant, breast 
implants and super absorbent tampons. Clearly, limiting noneconomic 
damages in these products liability cases hanns female plaintiffs. 
Although this gendered result may be completely inadvertent or 
unintended, its effect is devastating. 
Koenig and Rustad demonstrate that limiting noneconomic 
damages disproportionately affects female litigants.32 Women earn 
lower incomes, largely because they spend more time on unpaid child 
care, housekeeping and other relational care. As a result, female 
litigants tend to have lesser economic losses than their male 
counterparts.33 Moreover, physical injuries to women may not result 
in significant damages awards since no current medical treatments 
may exist.34 For example, a "soccer mom" who suffers injury by 
having to undergo a hysterectomy caused by a Dalkon Shield or other 
intrauterine device suffers little economic harm. Restricting or 
limiting her noneconomic damages may result in an insignificant 
award of damages. For those reasons, Martha Chamallas argues that: 
"For feminists who maintain that the market reflects and reinforces 
30. Koenig & Rustad, supra note 12, at 85. 
31. [d. at 61-62. 
32. [d. at 80. 
33. [d. at 78-79. 
34. See Lucinda M. Finley, Female Trouble: The Implications of Tort Reformfor Women, 64 
TENN. L. REV. 847,847-57, 861-66, 870 (1997); see also Koenig & Rustad, supra note 
12, at 64-77. 
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cultural biases and systems of privilege, changing tort law to curtail 
noneconomic damages seems misguided. They argue that such reform 
solidifies the tendency to privilege economic losses over noneconomic 
ones, and intensifies implicit gender bias in tort law.,,35 
Medical malpractice litigation has been a source of substantial 
reform efforts. Generally, advocates of caps on noneconomic 
damages argue for practical results rather than doctrinal purity. The 
argument goes that caps will lead to lower malpractice premiums for 
physicians preventing them from deserting certain medical specialties 
or geographical areas. Similarly, in the products liability arena, caps 
are viewed as an instrument for preventing manufacturer abandonment 
of significant innovation and product development or from engaging 
in a "race to the bottom" offering the least possible protection for the 
victims of defective products. 
However, the nexus between damages caps and these legitimate 
policy issues remain attenuated. For example, in addressing the 
medical malpractice issue, a 2003 General Accounting Office study 
found: 
Interested parties debate the impact these various 
measures may have had on premium rates. However, a 
lack of comprehensive data on losses at the insurance 
company level makes measuring the precise impact of 
the measures impossible. As noted earlier, in the vast 
majority of cases, existing data do not categorize losses 
on claims as economic or noneconomic, so It IS not 
possible to quantify the impact of a cap on 
noneconomic damages on insurers' losses. Similarly, it 
is not possible to show exactly how much a cap would 
affect claim frequency or claims-handling costs. In 
addition, while most claims are settled and caps apply 
only to trial verdicts, some insurers and actuaries told 
us that limits on damages would still have an indirect 
impact on settlements by limiting potential damages 
should the claims go to trial. But given the limitations 
on measuring the impact of caps on trial verdicts, an 
35. CHAMALLAS, supra note 19, at 202. 
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indirect impact would be even more difficult to 
measure.36 
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Moreover, Lucinda Finley's 2004 review of the efficacy of 
statutory limitations on noneconomic damages reached similar 
results.37 She argues that women will be among the "hidden victims 
of tort reform" who will be less likely to obtain lawyers willing to 
represent them?8 Professor Finley's empirical study included analysis 
of jury verdicts in Maryland, Florida and California. She concludes 
that women, children and the elderly will be most affected by damage 
caps, arguing: "[T]hese disparate negative effects will be especially 
pronounced for elderly women. . . . [C]ap laws will also place an 
effective ceiling on recovery for certain types of injuries 
disproportionately experienced by women, including sexual assault 
and gynecological injury, that impair childbearing or sexual 
functioning. ,,39 
Lucinda Finley concludes that decreasing the recovery value of 
these injuries for women will mean that lawyers will be unwilling to 
take meritorious claims which are not cost-efficient.4o She argues that 
the effect of statutory damage caps will be "[T]he message that 
women, the elderly, and the parents of dead children should not bother 
to apply.,,41 
IV. PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
The Maryland approach to punitive damages aggravates the 
statutory cap problem by making it extremely difficult to recover 
punitive damages. For the plaintiff to recover punitive damages, the 
defendant must be characterized by "evil motive, intent to injure, or 
fraud,,,42 i.e., actual malice. Essentially a two-prong test has evolved: 
First, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant had actual 
36. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE: MULTIPLE FACTORS 
HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO INCREASED PREMIUM RATES 42-43 (2003). 
37. Finley, Hidden Victims, supra note 10, at 1267-80. 
38. Jd. at 1313. 
39. Jd. 
40. Jd. 
41. Jd.; see generally Marc Galanter & David Luban, Poetic Justice: Punitive Damages and 
Legal Pluralism, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1393 (1993) (arguing that tort reform makes 
contingency fee-based law practices less profitable, forcing plaintiffs lawyers to 
represent fewer litigants or abandon the market altogether). 
42. Owens Corning v. Bauman, 125 Md. App. 454, 533, 726 A.2d 745,784 (1999); Owens-
Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia, 325 Md. 420, 460, 601 A.2d 633, 652 (1992). 
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knowledge of the defect. Second, the plaintiff must prove that the 
defendant exhibited deliberate disregard of the consequences of that 
defect.43 Moreover, punitive damages must be proven by clear and 
convincing evidence.44 
Noneconomic damage recovery, such as the award of punitive 
damages, is extremely important to women litigants because they heTs 
counteract the low value placed on women's economic claims. 5 
Punitive damages, pain and suffering and other noneconomic damage 
awards help correct the bias in tort damage awards. Preferring 
economic losses over noneconomic claims reinforces implicit gender 
bias. 
V. COMPARATIVE FAULT AND CONTRIBUTORY 
NEGLIGENCE 
Although the doctrine of comparative fault46 is accepted in almost 
every jurisdiction, Maryland has not adopted it.47 Comparative fault's 
widespread acceptance stems from the harshness of the contributory 
negligence rule which bars a plaintiff from any recovery against a 
tortfeasor, if the plaintiff was at fault in any respect in connection with 
the accident.48 The harshness and potential unfairness of the 
contributory negligence approach is that it "[P]laces upon one party 
the entire burden of a loss for which two are, by hypothesis, 
responsible.,,49 By contrast, the doctrine of comparative fault does not 
take this all-or-nothing approach to accident liability. Rather the 
doctrine proportionately reduces the accident victim's damages 
according to the victim's fault. 5o The doctrine can significantly alter 
the results in products liability and other litigation.51 
43. Zenobia, 325 Md. at 462,601 A.2d at 653. 
44. [d. at 469,601 A.2d at 657. 
45. Finley, supra note 34 (arguing that tort refonn proposals have a "possible adverse impact 
on women and women's health."). 
46. See DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW (2005) 811 n.l [hereinafter OWEN, 
PRODUCTS LAW]; W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 
§ 67, at 468-69 (5th ed. 1984). 
47. The only other jurisdictions are Alabama, The District of Columbia, North Carolina and 
Virginia. See OWEN, PRODUCTS LAW, supra note 46. 
48. [d. at 811. 
49. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., supra note 46. 
50. OWEN, PRODUCTS LAW, supra note 46, at 811-12. 
51. See REsTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 1 cm!. a (2000); 
UNIF. APPORTIONMENT OF TORT REsPONSIBILITY ACT § 3 (amended 2003), 12 U.L.A. 12 
(Supp. 2006). 
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Maryland's contributory negligence doctrine may be especially 
problematic for women litigants. Feminist scholars argue that 
negligence's "reasonable person" standard may not reflect women's 
experiences and sensibilities. 52 The "reasonable person" standard is a 
mainstay of the view that law is objective in viewpoint. The objective, 
"reasonable person" standard is intended to encourage the trier of fact 
to reach an unbiased result, which avoids the perspective of either 
litigant.53 However, this "objectivity" has been criticized as an 
example of "point-of-viewlessness,,,54 which actually ignores 
women's experiences by adopting the viewpoint of the dominant, male 
groUp.55 
Maryland's view of the sole proximate harm issue complicates the 
contributory negligence problem. Anthony Pools v. Sheehan56 is an 
example of these issues in current Maryland products liability law. In 
Maryland, plaintiff's contributory negligence defeats a negligence 
claim. However, simgle contributory negligence cannot bar a strict 
liability in tort claim. To bar the strict liability claim, the plaintiff 
must assume the risk.58 Nevertheless, in Maryland, the doctrine of 
"sole proximate cause" may brin~ ordinary contributory negligence 
back into a products liability case.5 In a strict products liability claim, 
the plaintiff must still demonstrate that the product defect is the 
proximate cause of the plaintiff's harm.6o In effect, the same actions 
which might be considered plaintiff's contributory negligence may 
52. A Lawyer's Primer, supra note 9, at 31 (stating that "Negligence law could begin with .. 
. the feminine voice's ethic of care -- a premise that no one should be hurt. We could 
convert the present standard of 'care of a reasonable person under the same or similar 
circumstances' to a standard of 'conscious care and concern of a responsible neighbor or 
social acquaintance for another under the same or similar circumstances. "'). But cf 
Richard A. Posner, Conservative Feminism, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 191,214 (arguing 
"most neighbors are not caring, and most accident victims are not neighbors. Human 
nature will not be altered by holding injurers liable for having failed to take the care that 
a caring neighbor would have taken."). 
53. CHAMALLAS, supra note 19, at 57. 
54. CATHERINEA.MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 162 (1989). 
55. [d. 
56. 295 Md. 285,455 A.2d 434 (\983) (holding that plaintiff's claim was not barred by his 
contributory negligence when he was injured as he fell off the side of the diving board of 
his new swimming pool onto the concrete coping at the edge of the pool). 
57. Sheehan v. Anthony Pools, 50 Md. App. 614, 626, 440 A.2d 1085, 1092 (1982). The 
Court of Appeals of Maryland adopted Part III of the Court of Special Appeals' decision. 
Anthony Pools v. Sheehan, 295 Md. at 299, 455 A.2d at 441. 
58. See generally Dix W. Noel, Defective Products: Abnormal Use, Contributory 
Negligence, and Assumption of Risk, 25 VAND. L. REv. 93 (1972). 
59. See, e.g., Anthony Pools, 50 Md. App. at 622, 440 A.2d at 1090. 
60. See id. at 621-23, 440 A.2d at 1090. 
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reappear in the defendant's argument as also constituting the sole 
proximate cause of the harm.61 In other words, the plaintiffs risk-
taking behavior, rather than any alleged product defect, is the "sole 
proximate cause" of the product user's harm.62 
In Anthony Pools, in his strict liability tort action, the plaintiff 
asserted that the fact that non-skid material on the diving board did not 
extend to and over the edges of the diving board constituted a design 
defect. 63 Defense counsel argued the plaintiff s injury was not caused 
by any product defect, but rather by the way the plaintiff used the 
diving board. In closing argument, defense counsel argued: 
You must find that this defect proximately caused 
the accident. The clear testimony here from Mr. 
Weiner and using your common sense is that if 
someone steps on the board with about an inch of their 
foot on it, they will fall off the side. That was the 
proximate cause, the way the board was used, not the 
design of the board. I am not willing to concede for a 
moment that there is anything defective about the 
board .... [E]ven if you feel there was, I ask you to 
find that the proximate cause was the way Mr. Sheehan 
used it, not the way it was designed.64 
The trial judge denied the defendant's request to instruct the jury 
that contributory negligence was a defense, and also denied the 
plaintiff s request to instruct the jury that the plaintiff s inadvertence 
in using the diving board was not a defense.65 Reversing the jury 
verdict for the defendant, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland 
held that the trial court should have granted the plaintiffs instruction 
on inadvertence. 66 
Anthony Pools indicates that juries can be easily confused about the 
role of the accident victim's conduct in establishing product defect and 
liability. Accident victim carelessness, inadvertence, and risk-taking 
activity must be considered, but should not be a complete bar to 
61. See id. at 622, 440 A.2d at 1090. 
62. OWEN, PRODUCTS LAW, supra note 46, at 809-10. 
63. Anthony Pools, 50 Md. App. at 616, 440 A.2d at 1087. 
64. [d. at 622, 440 A.2d at 1090. In this case, the defense counsel is using the rubric of "sole 
proximate cause" to defeat the plaintiffs strict liability claim by arguing that the way the 
plaintiff used the diving board rather than the design of the diving board was the 
proximate cause of the injury. 
65. /d. 
66. [d. at 626, 440 A.2d at 1092. 
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products liability recovery. Their effect, as doctrines limiting liability, 
and the effect of the doctrine of sole proximate cause, must only be 
applied in a manner which assures fairness in products liability 
litigation. 
Maryland negligence law, with its emphasis on contributory 
negligence, adds to the problems women litigants face. In evaluating 
whether an individual has acted "reasonably," negligence standards, 
by definition, measure women's actions according to traditional male 
norms and viewpoints. Male norms simply may ignore the impact of 
female experience and conduct on notions of reasonableness. 
Similarly, confusing the separate products liability doctrines of defect 
and causation with the unhelpful rubric of "sole proximate cause" 
reduces the likelihood of achieving a just result. 
VI. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS 
LIABILITY 
The Products Liability Restatement has not been adopted in 
Maryland. Nevertheless, its potential impact on gender discrimination 
must be considered. The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products 
Liability has been the subject of considerable debate67 and criticism.6s 
However, the concerns of feminist jurisprudence have been largely 
ignored.69 Increasingly, feminist scholars7o have argued that an ethic 
67. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY (1998) [hereinafter PRODUCTS 
LIABILITY RESTATEMENT]; see, e.g., Symposium, Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products 
Liability: Is the Best Defense Redefining the Offense?, 26 N. Ky. L. REV. 531, 678 
(1999); see also James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Will a New Restatement 
Help Settle Troubled Waters: Reflections, 42 AM. U. L. REv. 1257 (1993). 
68. See, e.g., Marshall S. Shapo, In Search of the Law of Products Liability: The ALI 
Restatement Project, 48 VAND. L. REV. 631 (1995); see generally John F. Vargo, The 
Emperor's New Clothes: The American Law Institute Adorns "New Cloth" for Section 
402A Products Liability Design Defects: A Survey of the States Reveals a Different 
Weave, 26 U. MEM. L. REv. 493 (1996). 
69. For a student comment addressing feminist concerns with section 6(c), see Dolly M. 
Trompeter, Comment, Sex, Drugs, and the Restatement (Third) of Torts, Section 6(c): 
Why Comment E is the Answer to the Woman Question, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 1139 (1999). 
There is considerable feminist jurisprudence on tort law. See, e.g., Bender, A Lawyer's 
primer, supra note 9; Bender, supra note 11; Finley, supra note 45; Lucinda M. Finley, 
Guarding the Gate to the Courthouse: How Trial Judges Are Using Their Evidentiary 
Screening Role to Remake Tort Causation Rules, 49 DEPAULL. REv. 335 (1999). 
70. There are many schools of feminist scholarship including cultural feminists, 
accommodation feminists, radical feminists, and critical legal studies feminists. They all 
share the goal of incorporating women's experiences and values into law and of 
employing feminist methodology. See generally Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal 
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of care,71 promoting considerations of empathy and interdependence 
must be integrated into law. Unlike competing analyses, such as the 
law and economics approach,n which seek to achieve justice by 
deciding disputes with the object of promoting greater social good 
through wealth maximization resolutions,73 cultural feminists find the 
efficiency norm unworkable. Cultural feminism regards law as just 
and equitable only when administered with empathy, resulting in a 
redistributive impact for economically and politically disadvantaged 
members of societr 74 At first blush, efficiency and empathy appear to 
be irreconcilable.7 Nevertheless, I argue that, in the world of products 
liability, efficiency and wealth maximization must be reconciled with 
requirements of empathy and fairness. The Products Liability 
Restatement shift from strict liability to negligence essentially adopts 
the law and economics focus on efficiency and wealth maximization in 
derogation of empathic care as a normative principle of justice.76 The 
claims of cultural feminism, emphasizing empathic care and 
interdependence, are essential for a valid products liability doctrine. 
Indeed, empathy and efficiency can and must be merged into a 
construct where both are achievable and viable. 
Major concepts in the law of products liability, such as 
defectiveness, causation, and damages, reveal social policy 
considerations. One group of scholars emphasizes the role of products 
liability law in deterring product injury by providing appropriate 
incentives to product manufacturers. The other group focuses on 
products liability as an after the fact attempt to achieve corrective 
justice between the product producer and the product user. Often the 
scholarship of each group either ignores or deprecates the views of the 
other. I suggest that feminist jurisprudence may provide an important 
Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829 (1990); Deborah L. Rhode, Feminist Critical Theories, 
42 STAN. L..REv. 617 (1990). 
71. The ethic of care or cultural feminism owes much to the work of Carol Gilligan. See, e.g., 
CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982). 
72. See generally GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS (1970). 
73. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE (1981). 
74. See Ann C. Scales, The Emergence of a Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay, 95 YALE L.J. 
1373 (1986); Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. I (1988); see 
generally MATTHEW H. KRAMER, CRmCAL LEGAL THEORY AND THE CHALLENGE OF 
FEMINISM (1995). 
75. Cf CALABRESI, supra note 72, at 24, 307-08. 
76. See, e.g., Mark McLaughlin Hager, Don't Say I Didn't Warn You (Even Though I 
Didn't): Why the Pro-Defendant Consensus on Warning Law Is Wrong, 61 TENN. L. REv. 
1125, 1133 (1994); see generally William L. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel 
(Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE LJ. 1099 (1960). 
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bridge in this products liability scholarly gap. Specifically, a cultural 
feminist ethic of care can provide significant new insights for products 
liability doctrine. 
A. Products Liability Goals of Efficiency and Corrective Justice 
i 
For . more than a decade, a vigorous tort reform debate has 
refocused examination of how legal rules promote the goals of 
compensation and deterrence.77 Numerous scholars have studied the 
question of how to compensate tort victims for their injuries.78 
Clearly, payments to tort victims can have both compensatory and 
deterrent goals. Nevertheless, payments needed to promote deterrence 
may not be identical to payments needed to attain compensatory 
goals.79 
An important tort compensation theory is the insurance theory --
the theory that tort payments should be based on the insurance choices 
which individuals would make in actuarially fair markets.8o The 
insurance theory has significant theoretical and practical implications 
in that it provides a radical shift from the major compensation 
paradigm of tort law -- the "make the tort victim whole" theory of 
recovery. 8 1 Moreover, the insurance theory has received support from 
prominent scholars in the tort reform debate, including law and 
economics scholar Professor Steven Shavell,82 empirical analysts 
Professors W. Kip Viscusi 83 and Patricia Danzon,84 and theorists such 
77. See, e.g., Products Liability Law Symposium, 53 S.C. L. REv. 777 (2002). 
78. See, e.g., RandalJ R. Bovbjerg, Frank A. Sloan & James F. Blumstein, Valuing Life and 
Limb in Tort: Scheduling "Pain and Suffering," 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 908 (1989); Stanley 
Ingber, Rethinking Intangible Injuries: A Focus on Remedy, 73 CAL. L. REV. 772 (1985). 
79. See generally George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modem Tort Law, 96 
YALEL.J. 1521 (1987). 
80. Id. at 1556 (stating that when the tort victim purchases a product or service she pays in 
advance for insurance so that "[C]ompel[ing) insurance greater than the amount 
demanded by the purchaser reduces, rather than increases, his or her welfare."). 
81. See, e.g., FOWLER V. HARPER, FLEMING JAMES, JR. & OSCAR S. GRAY, THE LAW OF 
TORTS, § 25.1 at 493 (Little, Brown, and Co. 2d ed. 1986) (1956) (examining the 
traditional tort damage rule). 
82. See Steven ShavelJ, Economic Analysis of Accident Law 260-61 (1987). 
83. See W. Kip Viscusi, Reforming Products Liability 89-94 (1991). 
84. See Patricia M. Danzon, Tort Reform and the Role of Government in Private Insurance 
Markets, 13 J. Legal Stud. 517, 520-26 (1984); Patricia M. Danzon, Medical 
Malpractice: Theory, Evidence and Public Policy IO (1985). 
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as Professor Alan Schwartz.85 It is also supported by the American 
Law Institute.86 
Some aspects of the Products Liability Restatement, no matter how 
well grounded in products liability policy or in theories of justice, 
nevertheless, will have the unintended consequences of harming 
women. Therefore, the Restatement doctrine must be analyzed and 
evaluated. In particular, the Restatement's transition from strict 
liability to negligence doctrine raises legitimate concerns for feminists. 
Negligence is generally considered more difficult to prove than strict 
liability in tort law.87 Another concern is the adoption of a more 
stringent standard for determining medical product and prescription 
drug defectiveness than for other products. 
An additional concern is normative, asking which values should 
fashion products liability doctrine. Products liability doctrine reveals 
societal values and priorities in valuing wealth, safety and innovation. 
Should products liability be premised on fault or on strict liability? 
Should deterrence or compensation be preferred?88 
B. Moral and Economic Theories 
1. Corrective Justice and Distributive Justice 
Corrective justice seeks to right wrongs by restoring the 
balance of rights which have been wrongly disrupted.89 Suppose a 
manufacturer's product Injures a product consumer. The 
manufacturer's liability might depend on concepts of corrective justice 
-- what it takes to right the wrong done by the manufacturer. If the 
manufacturer is bankrupt or judgment-proof, the issue might be 
whether consumers and manufacturers as a group should use some of 
their money to help the injured consumer. This becomes a distributive 
85. Alan Schwartz, Proposals for Products Liability Reform: A Theoretical Synthesis, 97 
Yale L.J. 353, 362-67 (1988). 
86. See The Am. Law Inst. Reporters' Study on Enter. Responsibility for Pers. Injury: 
Volume II Approaches to Legal & Institutional Change (1991). This study, released in 
April 1991, discusses the insurance theory of compensation, and states that "[e]mpirical 
corroboration of these analytical claims" exists. Id. at 206 n.l3; see generally Stephen D. 
Sugarman, A Restatement of Torts, 44 Stan. L. Rev. 1163 (1992) (book review). 
87. See, e.g., Page Keeton, Product Liability and the Meaning of Defect, 5 St. Mary's L.J. 30, 
34-35 (1973). 
88. See generally David G. Owen, Philosophical Foundations of Fault in Tort Law, in 
Philosophical Foundations of Tort Law 20 I (1995). 
89. Catharine Pierce Wells, Ton Law as Corrective Justice: A Pragmatic Justification for 
Jury Adjudication, 88 Mich. L. Rev. 2348, 2350 (1990). 
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justice question of how society's assets should be distributed among 
people. 
2. Corrective Justice v. Utilitarian Approach to Justice 
Corrective justice can be contrasted with a utilitarian approach to 
justice. Under a utilitarian approach, we ask what is good for society 
as a whole.9o The manufacturer's fault in causing the product user's 
harm is a basis for deciding the case based on corrective justice.9 ] We 
can conclude that the blameworthy manufacturer should pay 
compensation to the product user since it redresses a wrong when 
compensation is paid. As a result,. fault or unreasonableness provides 
a legitimate moral basis for corrective justice.92 
3. Corrective Justice and Strict Liability 
In some situations, although neither the product manufacturer nor 
the product user is at fault, the user, nevertheless, is injured by the 
product. Unless the product manufacturer is held strictly liable, the 
innocent product user must bear the loss. In other words, without 
manufacturer strict products liability, the blameless product user must 
pay for his losses. Therefore, strict products liability is consistent with 
concepts of corrective justice.93 
Richard Epstein is a major proponent of strict liability on the basis 
of corrective justice. Basically, Epstein argues that strict liability is 
preferable to a negligence system because negligence is not morally 
grounded.94 Negligence cannot promote moral responsibility because 
it weighs into the balance the social utility of the defendant's conduct 
or product.95 Epstein would argue that regardless of the social utility 
90. Virginia E. Nolan & Edmund Ursin, The Revitalization of Hazardous Activity Strict 
Liability, 65 N.C. L. Rev. 257,286-93 (1987) (stressing the importance of loss spreading, 
fairness and safety in strict products liability). 
91. !d. at 286. 
92. See generally Jules L. Coleman, Tort Law and the Demands of Corrective Justice, 67 
Ind. L.J. 349 (1992). Often court decisions confinn the core morality of redressing fault. 
Cf Gary T. Schwartz, The Beginning and Possible End of the Rise of Modem American 
Tort Law, 26 Ga. L. Rev. 601 (1992) (analyzing judicial rejection of some forms of strict 
liability in products liability cases). 
93. See generally Jules L. Coleman, The Morality of Strict Tort Liability, 18 Wm. & Mary L. 
Rev. 259 (1976). 
94. See generally Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. Legal Stud. 151 
(1973). 
95. Id. at 153. 
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of defendant's product, if it harms the plaintiff, the defendant should 
be liable.96 
C. The Products Liability Restatement Meets the Feminist Ethic of 
Care 
Cultural feminists argue that tort law should emphasize safety 
rather than profit or efficiency.97 They view the masculine voice, with 
its protection of rights, autonomy, and abstraction, as a standard which 
promotes only efficiency and profit.98 According to the feminist ethic 
of care, a much-needed feminine voice would refocus the tort system 
to encourage behavior which is caring about safety and responsive to 
victim needs, with their attendant human contexts and consequences.99 
Over the past decade, feminist scholars have provided significant 
critiques of tort doctrines.lOo The critiques have applied various 
schools of feminist theory. 101 
Feminist scholarship has demonstrated that contemporary tort law 
reinforces the economic subordination of women. 102 The traditional 
devaluation of women's work, including child rearing and 
homemaking, has affected the damage awards for women. 103 When 
the tort law determines which harms are worthy of legal protection, to 
what extent these harms should be compensated, and how they should 
be valued, it makes fundamental judgments which affect tort 
victims. 104 Tort settlements and damage awards represent both 
economic security and fundamental fairness. 105 Moreover, tort law 
expresses the social value placed upon certain relationships and 
I . 106 persona mterests. 
Given the economic position of women, it is not altogether 
surprising that women receive less tort compensation than men. The 
basic, underlying purpose of tort damages is to place the injured 
96. [d.; see generally Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability: Toward a 
Reformation of Tort Law (1980); Jules L. Coleman, Corrective Justice and Wrongful 
Gain, 11 J. Legal Stud. 421 (1982). 
97. See, e.g., Bender, A Lawyer's Primer, supra note 9. 
98. [d. 
99. [d. 
100. See generally Bender, supra note II. 
101. [d. 
102. See Chamallas, supra note 19. 
103. [d. 
104. See Finley, supra note 10. 
105. [d. 
106. [d. 
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plaintiff in her pre-accident economic position. 107 Most empirical 
studies demonstrate that women, regardless of race, receive 
significantly lower tort damage awards than white men. !OS 
Interestingly, the efforts to study gender and race bias in the courts 
have provided much of the data demonstrating the higher value placed 
on white men's lives and injuries. 109 For example, as previously 
discussed, Martha Chamallas has demonstrated through empirical 
studies that awards for male plaintiffs were twenty-seven percent 
higher than those for women in a 1995 guide for personal injury 
lawyers. I 10 
Gender-based generalizations about women lead courts to under 
calculate tort damages for the loss of future earning capacity. III 
Damages for the loss of future earning capacity compensates the tort 
victim for injuries that impair earning power. 112 When a young 
woman is injured, economists appearing as expert witnesses often rely 
on tables based on past economic patterns. 113 These tables project that 
women will work fewer years than men and will earn less money than 
their male counte~arts.114 As a result, women receive dramatically 
reduced awards. 1 I Employing these gender-based generalizations 
ignores the fact that individual women may alter traditional patterns of 
employment participation. Applying liberal feminist principles would 
produce tangible gains for women because their experiences and 
viewpoints would be the norm rather than the exception. 
General tort principles submerged into the Products Liability 
Restatement, as previously discussed, create problems from a feminist 
perspective. For example, the "reasonable person" tort law standard 
can be viewed as problematic. Although the standard may be 
perceived as objective, it may actually result in what Catherine 
MacKinnon has described as "point-of-viewlessness.,,1l6 Objective 
107. Fleming James, Jr., Damages in Accident Cases, 41 Cornell L. Q. 582, 582 (1956). 
108. See Charnallas, supra note 19. 
109. See generally Judith Resnik, Asking About Gender in Courts, 21 Signs: J. Women in 
Culture and Soc'y 952 (1996). 
110. Chamallas, supra note 19. 
Ill. See generally Chamallas, Questioning the Use, supra note 13, at 84-89; Chamallas, 





116. MacKinnon, supra note 54, at 162 (arguing that objectivity does not exist -- rather the 
attempt to appear objective actually reflects the viewpoint of the dominant group). 
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analysis is often the viewpoint of the dominant group, accepted as 
valid because the dominant group's version of reality is deemed 
true. I I7 
Leslie Bender has re-examined the tort "no duty to rescue" doctrine 
from a cultural feminist perspective. I 18 Bender argues that liability 
should result when an individual refuses to save a stranger since that 
stranger should be viewed as a person who is interconnected with the 
community and whose well-being, therefore, affects others. 1 19 
Another problematic area of the products liability arena is the "fetal 
protection" policies which exclude women from certain workplaces. 120 
American products liability law, as it developed for three decades, 
came closer to achieving these goals than the Products Liability 
Restatement. Under the Restatement (Second) of Torts, if a medical 
product harmed a patient, she could be compensated by bringing a tort 
claim against the manufacturer. 121 The patient could establish liability 
in one of two ways: (1) under a negligence theory, she could establish 
liability by proving that the manufacturer lacked due care in designing, 
manufacturing or marketing the product; (2) under the theory of strict 
liability in tort, she could prove that the product was in a defective 
condition, unreasonably dangerous to the user. 122 Under the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 402A, a patient could find 
protection in a tort system concerned with care and safety rather than 
insulating product manufacturers from liability.123 This focus on the 
product user was to be expected since strict liability in tort, as 
recognized by Dean Prosser, a Reporter of the Restatement (Second), 
is grounded in notions of fairness and product user protection. 124 
However, the "tort reform" movement may have elevated product 
innovation, profit maximization and efficiency above user safety.125 
117. See id. 
118. Bender, A Lawyer's Primer, supra note 9, at 33-36. 
119.ld. 
120. See generally Sally J. Kenney, For Whose Protection? Reproductive Hazards and 
Exclusionary Policies in the United States and Britain (1992) (arguing that "fetal 
protection" policies excluding women from some toxic workplaces discriminate only 
against mothers even though fathers can also be affected from this environment). 
121. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965). 
122. See generally Kenney, supra note 120. 
123.ld. 
124. Prosser, supra note 76, at 1120 (quoting Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 
441 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring)). 
125. See, e.g., Joan E. Steinman, Women, Medical Care, and Mass Tort Litigation, 68 Chi.-
Kent L. Rev. 409 (1992). 
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Arguably, a prime example of this trend is section 6(c) of the Products 
Liability Restatement. 12 Section 6(c), which governs design defect 
liability for prescription drugs and medical devices, is one of the most 
controversial sections of the Products Liability Restatement since it 
requires the patient to prove that no reasonable healthcare Erovider 
would have prescribed the product for any class of patients. 1 7 Thus, 
in order for a patient to bring a successful claim for design defect, 
product users must demonstrate that they suffered harm and that no 
patient class could have derived benefit from the prescription drug or 
medical device. This new standard basically relieves medical product 
manufacturers of liability and responsibility. Since women consume 
more prescription drugs and products than men, 128 they are likely to be 
more disadvantaged by section 6(c). First, women consume a greater 
share of medical products than men. 129 Second, the regulatory system 
has not adequately tested and monitored products intended for women 
since men are generally the prototypes for medical studies and 
testing. 130 
Significantly, section 6(c) is not the only Products Liability 
Restatement provision which defines product design defect. Section 2 
establishes a separate standard of liability for defective product 
design. 131 This standard of liability for general product design is 
separate from medical or prescription products. 132 Section 2 allows an 
aggrieved product user more latitude in establishing design defect 
126. Products Liability Restatement, § 6(c) states: 
127.ld. 
A prescription drug or medical device is not reasonably safe due to 
defective design if the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the drug or 
medical device are sufficiently great in relation to its foreseeable 
therapeutic benefits that reasonable health care providers, knowing of 
such foreseeable risks and therapeutic benefits, would not prescribe the 
drug or medical device for any class of patients. 
128. L. Elizabeth Bowles, The Disfranchisement of Fertile Women in Clinical Trials: The 
Legal Ramifications of and Solutions for Rectifying the Knowledge Gap, 45 Vand. L. 
Rev. 877, 878 (1992) (discussing the fact that women consume more prescription drugs 
than men and disproportionately suffer a greater number of side effects from these 
drugs). 
129. See, e.g., Joan E. Steinman, Women, Medical Care, and Mass Tort Litigation, 68 Chi.-
Kent L. Rev. 409 (1992). 
130.ld. 
131. See Products Liability Restatement, §§ 2(b), 6(c). "Because of the special nature of 
prescription drugs and medical devices, the determination of whether such products are 
not reasonably safe is to be made under Subsections (c) and (d) rather than under §§ 2(b) 
and 2(c)." Id. § 6 cmt. b. 
132. Products Liability Restatement § 2 cmt. a. 
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liability. The Reporters of the Restatement admit that the 
requirements to establish general design liability are less stringent than 
those for medical products. I 33 Rather than proving that the product 
was ineffective for all users, section 2 allows the product user to 
present a reasonable alternative design as an effective means of 
establishing a design defect claim for general product defectiveness. 134 
The Restatement offers comment (e) as an exception to the liability 
standard for general product design defect claims in section 2.135 
Comment (e) provides that if the product's design renders its social 
utility low in relation to its potential to cause harm, liability attaches 
even though no reasonable alternative design exists. 136 The reasoning 
behind comment (e) is that rigid liability standards should not apply to 
products with extremely low social utility.137 Unfortunately, section 
6(c) does not have the same exception for prescription drugs and 
medical devices design defect claims. Simply stated, not all 
prescription drugs deserve special protection for public policy reasons; 
a cosmetic drug is not as important as life-saving chemotherapy. 
The seriousness of the general product defect exception in comment 
(e) is most harshly felt when examining these new theories of liability 
from the vantage point of the injured female patient. Clearly, adopting 
this exception to women asserting medical product design defect 
claims would lighten the female patient's legal burden. In turn, this 
would shift the focus from maximization of product manufacturer 
profits to appropriate concern for patient safety. 
Lucinda Finley argues that, "[T]orts suits define and signify basic 
social values about what human activities are worthy of protecting .. 
. ,,138 Unfortunately, the new standard established by section 6(c) of 
the Products Liability Restatement does not seem to value women's 
health and safety over corporate profits. The tort reform achieved by 
133. See id. § 6 cm!. f, (arguing Subsection c of section 6 imposes a more rigorous test for 
defect than does section 2(b) which does not apply to prescription drugs and medical 
devices). 
134. ld. § 2(b). This section provides a product defect: 
[I]s defective in design when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the 
product could have been reduced or avoided by the adoption of a 
reasonable alternative design by the seller or other distributor, or a 
predecessor in the commercial chain of distribution, and the omission of 
the alternative design renders the product not reasonably safe. 
135. See id. § 2 cm!. e. 
136. See id. 
137.ld. 
138. Finley, supra note 34, at 849. 
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the Products Liability Restatement reduces corporate liability and 
responsibility, resulting in an increase in corporate profits and a 
decrease in patient safety. Since men and women are different 
biologically, women suffer injuries from defective reproductive 
products placed inside their bodies, while men are seldom injured by 
such products. 139 These injuries suffered by women are difficult to 
assess in traditional economic terms, since they affect reproductive 
loss and other noneconomic losses. 140 Often these reproductive and 
emotional harms are not compensated in traditional tort damages. 141 
Nevertheless, they affect women's economic, educational and career 
choices. 142 The traditional tort approach, as exemplified by the 
Products Liability Restatement, tells women that their value in the 
labor force is not important enough to be incorporated into the market-
based tort reform formula. 143 Not only is the Products Liability 
Restatement approach unfair to those women harmed by medical 
products, it also sends a message to society as a whole that women are 
less valuable than their male counterparts. 144 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Maryland tort law discriminates against women in a number of 
important ways. Although facially neutral, the Maryland statutory cap 
on noneconomic damages and the standard for awarding punitive 
139. Koenig & Rustad, supra note 12, at 48. 
140. See, e.g., Finley, supra note 34, at 857-58. Many of these defective, unsafe products have 
been intended for the use by healthy women to affect, interrupt, or enhance natural bodily 
processes, rather than to treat illness or disease. They include: (1) Des, a synthetic 
estrogen marketed to prevent miscarriage which proved ineffective for that purpose, but 
elevated the risk of breast cancer among the exposed mothers by forty percent, and which 
caused cancer, reproductive abnormalities and infertility in the exposed daughters and 
sons of the pregnant women who took it; (2) Early versions of birth control pills which 
had high hormone levels that caused strokes, heart attacks and blood clots; (3) IUDs such 
as the Dalkon Shield and Copper-7, which presented an elevated risk of pelvic 
inflammatory disease, sterility, perforated uteruses and septic abortions; and (4) Parlodel, 
a drug prescribed to suppress lactation. which proved ineffective and caused deaths from 
strokes or heart attacks. See id. at 869. 
141. [d. at 857-58. 
142. [d. at 858. 
143. Finley, A Break in the Silence, supra note 27, at 52. The disparate impact of market-
based damage measurement is derived from two principle sources: I) the generally lower 
value the market assigns to women's work and 2) the market's failure to recognize or 
value many productive activities in which women engage, such as household 
management and care-taking performed within the family. 
144. [d. As Professor Martha Chamallas has noted, earning-based damages calculations signal 
that white men are worth more, and reinforce beliefs that they will achieve more than 
white women or minority men and women. Chamallas, supra note 19, at 197-98. 
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damages disadvantage women litigants. Moreover, adoption of the 
Products Liability Restatement would exacerbate the situation. 
Adding to this problem is Maryland's failure to adopt the doctrine of 
comparative negligence. The current Maryland approach is confusing 
and unfair. Disadvantaging women may be an unintended result of the 
current Maryland regime. Nevertheless, it should be remedied. 
Maryland tort law should take women's experiences and lives 
seriously. 
